di Claudio Bertolotti
@cbertolotti1
The
death of Mullah Mansour e the appointment of the new Taliban leader
On
the insurrectional front, recent dynamics have changed the internal
Taliban organization.
The
22nd
of May a U.S. drone attack in the Pakistani area of Baluchistan
killed the Taliban leader mullah Aktar Mohamad Mansour, criticized
successor of mullah Mohammad Omar, the charismatic and historic head
of the Taliban, died in 2013. The Mansour’s appointment was the
main cause of the fragmentation process of the Taliban movement.
The
current head of the Taliban, the Amir-ul-Momineen
(‘King of the believers’) is now Mawlawì Haibatullah
Akhundzada, former Mansour’s deputy; a role, apparently, fully
recognized by the Taliban Supreme Council (shura).
Who
is the new Taliban leader? Haibatullah is a mujaheddin without combat
experience, influencer and top advisor of Mullah Omar, a key and
influencing figure and a very respectable theologian (‘Mawlawì’
title indicate him as religious scholar): a complex profile mainly
theoretical that could facilitate the Taliban reunification process
thanks to a creed and symbolic approach.
Despite
of his lack in military experience and operational and strategic
capabilities, the
Taliban’s new chief, Mawlawì Haibatullah Akhundzada, has a
reputation as a respected religious scholar and comes from a strong
tribal background because Haibatullah's Noorzai sub-tribe is one of
the three big Durrani major tribes opposing the Ishaqzai tribe from
which the former Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansour comes. In
particular, the new Taliban leader comes from the Panjwai
district (province of Kandahar). The tribal factor is decisive in the
internal Taliban dialogue process; for this reason, the nomination of
Mawlawì
Haibatullah Akhundzada
is an option presented by the Taliban as joint and shared.
Mawlawì
Haibatullah Akhundzada is being closely observed to see if he will
try to shape the insurrectional objectives and ways. It is necessary
to look at the strength of the other leadership members, the
increasing role of the Rahbari Shura – the most important Taliban
council – and consider Pakistan’s role in decision-making. It
will not be easy for Haibatullah to change approach and policy on the
conduct of the war and on the role of the Taliban in the struggle for
power without the support of the other key players.
Haibatullah
derive his authority and legitimacy by the appointment of the Rahbari
Shura and not because he had been chosen by Mullah Omar; it means
that he would seem to have little choice than mullah Mansour, his
predecessor, given his absence of leadership practice, but to rely
heavily on Taliban bodies to run the armed opposition group.
Haibatullah
is seen as a hardliner, but this may not automatically carry any
evident policy consequences. He directly endorsed the major Mansur’s
policies, including the support to sensitive decisions (for example
the jihad against a competitor or opposite factions and approving,
with ‘directives’, female’s education, etc.), so it would be
bizarre if he wanted to change any of the policy lines he inherited
from the former head of the movement.
On
the one hand, it is likely that Haibatullah’s possible
subordination to the Taliban’s bureaucracy will boost the
movement’s evolution into a more institutionalised system; this
assessed evolution to institutional decision-making has also become
the only approach to maintain what is missing of the movement’s
unity (that actually it never existed).
On
the other hand, the growing weight of the bureaucracies in the
Taliban organization does not mean the movement is moving toward any
form of ‘democracy’ in its internal decision-making process
because not all the senior leaders are equal and have the same
authority in accordance with their personal capabilities, tribal
connections, geographical provenance (for example leaders from
Kandahar area – the ‘Kandaharis’ – have more influence and
power), and, in particular, military experience.
Looking for an internal
stabilization
Confirming
a role maintained by his predecessor Mansour, one of the Emir
Haibatullah
Akhundzada’s deputies is Sirajuddin Haqqani, head of the al-Qaeda
linked ‘Haqqani network’ and son of the strong mujaheddin
Jalaluddin Haqqani, died in 2014.
The
second deputy, who represents a significant change, is Mullah
Muhammad Yaqoub, son of Mullah Omar. On the one hand, Yaqoub is in a
position of secondary importance, powerless and weak in real control
capabilities.
On the other hand his appointment represents a sort of
reconciliation with the factions hostile to mullah Mansour side which
is looking with favor to the group loyal to mullah Mohammad Rassoul
(at present possibly detained in Pakistan), former Nimruz governor
and responsible for the ‘conquest’ of Kunduz city in September
2015.
The
appointment of Mullah Yaqoub is a political choice opening to the
factions excluded so far – and not recognizing the legitimacy of
the previous leadership –, and would demonstrate the will of
reunification of the fragmented insurrectional front.
It
is clear that the balance of power involving the threefold leadership
is unbalanced: the chief, mawlawì Haibatullah, with a religious and
symbolic role; a deputy, mullah Yaqoub, powerless and without
substantial capability; a second deputy, Sirajuddin Haqqani,
respected military commander linked to al-Qaeda and other armed
opposition groups, with a high financial capability.
Who
are the deputies of the new Taliban leader?
Deputy
Amir Sirajuddin Haqqani (son of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s, former
prominent commander during the anti-Soviet jihad and then high-level
figure during the Taliban era) is one of the few non-southerners
commander with a very important role within the Taliban movement,
even though he is not totally recognized as adequate by parts of the
movement. His appointment was welcomed in Loya Paktia (Paktia,
Paktika, Khost, Logar and Ghazni) but his role has been met with
concern elsewhere because the affinity of Sirajuddin (and the
‘Haqqani network’) with the Pakistani military and intelligence
service.
His
role in decision-making is prominent and strengthened by the results
and the capability of his military network on the battlefield – the
so called ‘Haqqani network’ – responsible for most of the
important and complex operations during the past decade in south
eastern Afghanistan and in the capital Kabul.
Because of the well-known
Haibatullah’s lack of military experience, is role as the deputy
for military affairs is furtherly increasing, in particular in
operational planning.
In
April 2016, deputy Amir Mullah Muhammad Yaqub was appointed as
military commander for the 15 southern and western provinces under
the overall chief of the Military Commission (at the present it is
not confirmed if Yaqub is still in charge). This choice was a
reaction to the growing concerns by military leaders in the south and
southwestern region about Sirajuddin Haqqani (who is a non-Kandahari
leader) achieving an important role in the military leadership, as he
was acting as a deputy for military affairs. It is interesting
underline that he has studied under the guidance of Haibatullah in
Quetta (where he has spent his entire adult life); it would make him
particularly compliant of his ‘teacher’.
Yaqub
spent his life in Pakistani madrassas, thus he is not deeply in touch
with the Afghan dynamics. But despite of this, it is assessed that he
has the loyalty and the support of a number of commanders and some
prominent leaders, as well as Gul Agha, the head of the Financial
Commission, Qayum Zaker, a respected commanders in the south, mawlawi
Shirin, in charge of the war for the remaining 19 provinces in the
east and north, and Nuruddin Turabi, former justice minister.
Extra
key figures of the movement are: Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Head of
the Cultural Commission, member of the Rahbari Shura and running the
Taliban’s media machine; mawlawì Hamdullah Nanai, former
communication minister, from Kandahar, influential in security and
military areas; Sadar Ibrahim, Chief of the Military Commission, from
Helmand; Amir Khan Haqqani (not belonging from Jalaluddin Haqqan
family), Deputy Chief of the Military Commission; Abdul Qayum Zaker
(former Guantanamo detainee) former chief of the Military Commission
leading Taliban forces during the ‘surge’ of American forces in
2009-2012; mawlawì Abdul Kabir, former Taliban-era military chief of
the eastern zone; mullah Muhammad Abbas Akhund, former minister of
health, at present he is the chief of the corresponding Health
Commission which negotiates with international health and
humanitarian organisations for access to areas under the movement
control; Gul Agha (aka Hedayatullah), the head of the Financial
Commission, from Helmand.
Analysis,
assessments and forecast
The
Taliban internal dynamics are not directly connected with the
progresses on the battlefield; progresses that are characterizing the
current year through the ‘spring offensive’ that obtained
positive results and more ground control for the Taliban, as
evidenced
by the siege of Tirin-Kot, provincial capital of Oruzgan, and the
defeat of the Afghan security forces. An episode followed to the
successes in Helmand in August, in Kunduz one year ago, the
escalation of violence in Kabul and the substantial monopoly of the
violence in southern and eastern areas.
On
the one hand, according to the U.S. government watchdog ‘Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’ (SIGAR) in July,
after 15 years of war the Taliban movement is able to control more of
the country than at any time since U.S. and international troops
started military operations in 2001. On the other hand, the United
Nations Secretary-General assessed in June that the general security
situation in Afghanistan is worsening significantly, following a
negative trend for the Afghan government’s capabilities to maintain
the control of eastern, southern and peripheral areas. In the
complex, the fragile economy, political and security situation is
worsening. These reported successes on the Taliban front is part of
the Taliban dynamics characterized by an internal stabilization
process followed the death of the former leader Mansour.
Concluding,
more in general the economic, political and security situation is
worsening. A multilevel crisis that is complicating the peace-process
that at the present is in ‘stand-by’, waiting for the Taliban at
the negotiation process table opened by the Quadrilateral
Coordination Group (Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and United States).
However, the Taliban – and their leadership – are still looking
for a reason to take part to the peace-talks.
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