Abstract
If compared with a ‘new civil war’ scenario (consequential to the dissolution of the Afghan State and the Afghan National Security Forces and the victory for the Armed Opposition Groups), events during 2012 tend to suggest a 2013-2014 scenario characterised by: an increase of local level conflicts; a political and social instability of the Afghan state and an ANSF unpreparedness – partially counterbalanced by
NATO’s effort and support. The end result in the medium term is that Afghanistan will be kept in a condition of
unstable ‘dynamic stalemate’.
2013-2014 will be characterized by the implementation of the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement which will guarantee the new formula of a U.S. military presence on the Afghan soil based on the medium-long term concession of strategic military bases.
The United States and the NATO, renouncing a real Afghan stabilisation, will proceed with the transition phase with a significant assistance and support to the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces), at the moment unable to guarantee an effective control of the country.
The Taliban – formally and substantially undefeated – are military able, yet at the same time unable to defeat NATO-ISAF and ANSF troops on the battlefield.
Therefore, the Taliban will try to limit significantly the ANSF operational potential (and thus the effectiveness of transition) through the ‘trust-undermining’ process between NATO-ISAF advisors/trainers and mentored ANSF individuals.
A direct effect of this process is the increasing phenomenon of the ‘green on blue attacks’ (Afghan soldiers who attack their advisors and mentors), contributing to a further acceleration of the disengagement from the country.
Internally, political and electoral processes (characterized by limited transparency and evident frauds) will be influenced by the AOGs (Armed Opposition Groups) especially in rural and peripheral areas, in particular the Pashtun-dominated ones.
NATO’s effort and support. The end result in the medium term is that Afghanistan will be kept in a condition of
unstable ‘dynamic stalemate’.
2013-2014 will be characterized by the implementation of the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement which will guarantee the new formula of a U.S. military presence on the Afghan soil based on the medium-long term concession of strategic military bases.
The United States and the NATO, renouncing a real Afghan stabilisation, will proceed with the transition phase with a significant assistance and support to the ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces), at the moment unable to guarantee an effective control of the country.
The Taliban – formally and substantially undefeated – are military able, yet at the same time unable to defeat NATO-ISAF and ANSF troops on the battlefield.
Therefore, the Taliban will try to limit significantly the ANSF operational potential (and thus the effectiveness of transition) through the ‘trust-undermining’ process between NATO-ISAF advisors/trainers and mentored ANSF individuals.
A direct effect of this process is the increasing phenomenon of the ‘green on blue attacks’ (Afghan soldiers who attack their advisors and mentors), contributing to a further acceleration of the disengagement from the country.
Internally, political and electoral processes (characterized by limited transparency and evident frauds) will be influenced by the AOGs (Armed Opposition Groups) especially in rural and peripheral areas, in particular the Pashtun-dominated ones.
Observing the current situation, we cannot exclude attempts of political partition of the country based on the willingness to obtain access to the economical advantages deriving from the mineral and energy resources. This would create ‘fault line conflicts’, amplified by the limited governmental administrative capabilities and
its high corruption level.
its high corruption level.
A positive role will be played by regional actors, which will increase their political and economical involvement.
In brief, in the next two years Afghanistan is going to be:
• relatively unstable from a domestic political perspective and exposed to the risk of a reduction of the role of the central government (advantaging local and peripheral powers),
• seriously precarious regarding its security and governance,
• inadequate vis-à-vis the transparency required by the international community’s economical support agreements due to an endemic corruption,
• surrounded by a dynamic and flexible environment regarding regional...
• relatively unstable from a domestic political perspective and exposed to the risk of a reduction of the role of the central government (advantaging local and peripheral powers),
• seriously precarious regarding its security and governance,
• inadequate vis-à-vis the transparency required by the international community’s economical support agreements due to an endemic corruption,
• surrounded by a dynamic and flexible environment regarding regional...
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